and Employment in Japan Japan has a relatively unique system of labor compensation. Most Japanese workers are paid large bonuses twice a year. This paper examines the cyclical movement of bonuses compared with wages and the relation of bonuses to employment in the context of the Weitzman "share economy." The paper makes three basic points: (1) The Japanese bonus is much more procyclical than Japanese base wages, but not as cyclically variable as profits. Bonuses can be interpreted as containing a quantitatively significant revenue-or profit-sharing component. (2) Bonuses have employment consequences quite different from those of base wages. Even after controlling for other economic factors, bonuses are positively related to employment, whereas base wages are negatively related to employment. (3) The bonus system of paying workers seems to play a modest role in helping to stabilize Japanese unemployment at comparatively low levels.
nuses, is one of the exotic features of Japanese labor markets that have long fascinated outsiders. Recently interest has been heightened by the realization that the bonus system may have important macroeconomic implications along the lines of a "share economy."' It is at least conceivable that some part of Japan's remarkable ability to stabilize unemployment at low, steady rates is due to the automatic pay flexibility that comes with profit or revenue sharing. For a subject of such potential importance, the Japanese bonus system has been studied relatively little.
This paper reports the results of a detailed empirical analysis of Japanese labor market data designed to address certain fundamental questions about the bonus system. In it we analyze data on bonuses and other labor market variables at the one-and two-digit industry levels from 1958 to 1983, as well as data from a case study of an individual firm. Our interpretations have been guided by the results of interviews with Japanese employer federation representatives and labor union officials.
BACKGROUND
The purpose of this section is to place the subject of the Japanese bonus system in a broader context. This is important because the bonus system is only one part of the complicated, interrelated web of institutions and attitudes that constitutes Japanese labor relations. Although we have tried hard to guard against a monocausal interpretation of the Japanese labor market, it is quite possible that in analyzing the bonus system we inadvertently overlook other important aspects of the industrial relations system that have also influenced the behavior under study.
The following stylized facts might be taken as roughly descriptive of how the "Japanese model" of the labor market differs somewhat from others.2
(1) Firms hire workers directly out of school for "lifetime employment" (the shuskin kayo system). In fact this is done primarily by the large firms, and only for their so-called "permanent" or "regular" employees. In the economy as a whole, 66% of all workers (including self-employed and family workers) are "regular" employees, of whom 54% are in firms with 50 regular employees or more and 24% in firms with 500 regular employees or more, making the permanent employees a minority of the work force. Nevertheless, the "lifetime commitment mentality" seems to be a fair characterization of the Japanese system as a whole.3
(2) There is a steep age-earnings profile for permanent workers up to retirement age of 55 or, more recently, 60. Pay is influenced greatly by seniority, but this nenko system has begun to erode in many places as it increasingly comes to be viewed as anachronistic and as Japan faces a decline in the number of younger workers relative to older workers. 4 (3) The Japanese workplace is a relatively cooperative and egalitarian environment. There are few work rules, job reassignments are common, and a high degree of company loyalty motivates productivity-enhancing behavior.5 Unions are organized along enterprise or company lines and include white-collar as well as blue-collar workers. In addition, blue-and white-collar workers in the same firm are comparatively less differentiated than elsewhere in terms of perquisites, treatment, method of payment (monthly salaries rather than hourly wages-with meaningful bonus payments), and how much they are paid.
(4) Japanese society as a whole displays a relatively intense commitment at a grass-roots level to maintaining full employment. Moreover, layoffs are not generally by seniority. There appears to be a high degree of social responsibility in wage setting in Japan, as was dramatically shown by labor's heeding the 1975 call for wage restraint in the face of strong inflation caused by the first oil shock. Work sharing is common, as Japanese firms tend to adjust hours more than employment and also to hoard more labor in downturns compared to firms in most other developed countries.6 (5) Bonuses are important quantitatively in the average worker's pay (upwards of one-quarter of pay is in the form of a semiannual bonus). They are also large relative to reported company profits, ranging from 42 to 76% of operating profits before taxes from 1965 to 1983, and have come to constitute roughly 10% of net domestic product.7 3 Koike (1983a, b , and references therein) sometimes argues the contrary view that Japanese industrial relations, and particularly the lifetime employment system, are not nearly so unique as is sometimes made out. He has a point when he does not push this view too hard. Another view is given by Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) . Tachibanaki notes that much of the difference in job tenure in Japan and the United States results from the fact that workers obtain permanent jobs directly out of school in Japan whereas in the United States workers job shop before taking a permanent job. For figures on regular employment see Japanese Ministry of Labor, "Yearbook of Labor Statistics," 1983, Table 4. 4 For discussion of the nenko system, see, e.g., Shimada, 1983 , or Shirai, 1983b . Also see Tachibanaki, 1982. 5 For descriptions of the Japanese workplace, see Koshiro, 1983a . See also Koike, Skill formation system in the U.S. and Japan: A comparative study, in Aoki, 1984. 6 On many of these points see Shirai, 1983b . Hours adjustments are discussed in Hamada and Kurosaka, 1984. 
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The typical Japanese worker's pay is divided into two categories. The first component is officially called kinatte shikyusuru kyuyo, "the wage that is surely paid," which we will refer to simply as base wages, although they are not hourly wages at all, but rather a monthly salary. (Actually, because wages are paid on a monthly basis the concept of "overtime" payments and work is not sharply differentiated in Japan, suggesting that employment rather than person-hours is the fundamental unit of labor usage for regular workers.) The second component is called "special cash payments" in the official statistics and the defining characteristic is held to be that it is a payment made "temporarily, unexpectedly, or erratically at the discretion of the employer." This category consists overwhelmingly of bonus payments, even though their terms and amount are often established by collective agreements and they are sometimes far from temporary, unexpected, or erratic.
Bonuses are usually paid twice a year-in summer (mostly June and July), and at year's end (December). Insignificant amounts are sometimes paid in August, March, and January. Although before the Second World War blue-collar and low-status white-collar workers often received a lump sum of money twice a year in addition to their regular pay, the small amount of money involved was in no way comparable to the significant semiannual bonuses received by high-status white-collar employees with advanced educational backgrounds. It was only after the war, that the payment system emerged in its present form, as part of a broader trend. The main feature of this trend was a deemphasis, to the point of nearelimination, of the invidious status categories of prewar Japan with their implicit legacies of a feudal past. As one by-product of the immediate postwar process of democratizing the workplace, which the unions fully supported, all regular employees-blue collar and white-were henceforth to be paid a monthly salary instead of an hourly wage, supplemented by meaningful semiannual bonuses for every regular employee irrespective of category.* The bonus payments constituted less than 2 months' worth of supplement after the war, rose gradually to over 4 months by 1973, and fell back to slightly more than 39 months currently.9
The bonus system is widely viewed as serving three purposes. One purpose, of particular relevance to this study, is that the bonus system provides some pay flexibility to help firms maintain the lifetime employment commitment over bad times and good. Another purpose is to com-pensate individual effort. Since the bonus is more discretionary than the base wage of the nenko system (which is primarily related to length of service), management typically makes some part of a particular employee's bonus depend on the merit appraisal of the individual worker's job performance.rO Finally, the bonus emphasizes, symbolically and practically, the common bond linking the company's well-being with the wellbeing of its regular workers.
The timing of wage decisions and the timing of bonus decisions generally differ. Across many unionized companies base-wage determination is the primary concern of the economywide pattern-bargaining spring wage offensive (shunto), which usually starts in February and peaks in April.rr Negotiations over bonuses are typically done after wages are settled; and, according to management and labor representatives, bonuses are more sensitive to a company's or an industry's specific circumstances than base wages, which are primarily dependent on the economy's national performance .
Firms that consistently do well generally succeed in paying a fairly steady number of month's wages as a bonus, so that in prospering sectors and times, their bonuses are unlikely to vary much with cyclical conditions. An oft-cited example of a firm that maintains such a policy is Toyota, which has paid about the same month's worth of bonus in each year since 1968. But for every Toyota Motor Company there are companies in, say, machine tools or shipbuilding where bonuses may vary from 2 to 10 months' pay in extreme economic conditions. At one such firm, Okuma Machine Works, the standard deviation of the percentage change of wages from 1957 to 1985 was 7, compared to a standard deviation of the percentage change of bonuses of 29. Bonuses varied from 9 months to 2 months of pay in postwar years. The majority of firms hold a position in between the positions of Toyota and Okuma. For manufacturing firms in the aggregate, the standard deviation of the log change in bonuses from 1959 to 1983 was 0.072 compared to a standard deviation of the log change of wages of 0.055.r2
Because our analysis is based on averages of firms within an industry, it is likely that we will understate the variation of bonuses at the level of firms and thus may find less variation with respect to shifts in profits or revenues than would be found in a firm-level study.
To what extent are bonuses directly related to profits through some sort of formula?
lo See, e.g., Okuno, 1984. I1 See Grossman and Haraf, 1983 . I2 The Okuma data calculated here are from the union's report to its workers. The standard deviations for manufacturing are calculated from the Ministry of Labor data in Appendixes A and B of this paper.
Surveys conducted by Nikkeiren, the employers' federation, show that most firms think of bonuses as being influenced by profitability. Among corporations that make an explicit agreement with employees about bonus payments, some 15% of such contracts contain profit-sharing clauses. I3
The Key Zssues
There are three critical issues in evaluating the macroeconomic implications of the Japanese bonus system.
The first is the extent to which bonuses are more "flexible" with respect to profits or revenues than are wages, and thus operate as a form of profit or revenue sharing.
The second is the effect of bonuses on employment. If bonuses are a cost to employers similar to wages, with no share component, bonuses plus wages are the relevant variable defining labor demand, with increases in bonuses reducing employment just as increases in wages do; contrarily, if bonuses have a nonnegligible profit-sharing component, they might have a very different relation to employment.
The third, and perhaps the most difficult issue to assess, is the contribution of a bonus system that operates along share-economy lines to the overall performance of the Japanese labor market either by itself or relative to other institutional factors, such as the flexibility of the base wage in the annual Shunto negotiations. Our work focuses solely on the potential impact of the bonus system itself on the labor market.
The remainder of the paper examines these three issues. Sections II and III analyze the determinants of bonuses and the link between bonuses and employment using data for the entire Japanese economy, for manufacturing, and for more disaggregated two-digit industries, largely within manufacturing. Section IV turns to the macroeconomic implications of our findings.
II. ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS AND BONUSES
Are bonuses more responsive to economic conditions than are wages, or are bonuses simply a markup of wages?
One direct way to examine the relative flexibility of bonuses and wages to economic conditions is to regress the ratio of monthly bonuses to monthly wages (the number of months of salary paid in bonuses, which is I3 Koshiro (1983b, pp. 241-242) gives a good discussion of bonus responsiveness to profits. For figures on firms with explicit profit-sharing see Japanese Ministry of Labor, "General Survey on Wage and Working Hours System." how most Japanese think of them) on measures of aggregate or industry economic conditions, conditional on past values of wages and bonuses. Table I contains the results of such an analysis for all industry and for manufactming in Japan. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of bonuses to wages from the series of the Japanese Ministry of Labor; it relates to all firms with five or more regular employees. To measure economic conditions we have used the log of profits (m) as reported in the Statistical Survey of Corporate Enterprise series of corporate operating profits for firms of all sizes, and two related measures of revenues: net domestic product (NDP) taken from the Japanese Economic Planning Agency data on net output by industrial origin at market prices, and corporate value added (VA) as reported in the Statistical Survey of Cor- porate Enterprises. All of the nominal variables are deflated by the wholesale price index (WPI) series of the Bank of Japan, with the total WPI used for the entire economy, the manufacturing price series used for manufacturing, and separate indices for more disaggregate industries. All three.indicators of economic conditions are measured over the Japanese fiscal year (April 1 to March 31), which correlates them more closely with the largely springtime determination of upcoming wage and bonus levels than with calendar year data. In addition to the measures of economic conditions, the equations include lagged values of bonuses (B-r) ana wages (W-i) introduced separately to allow for differential autoregressiveness of the series. The even-numbered equations include a linear time trend variable while the odd-numbered ones include time and a timesquare variable to allow for a more complex "exogenous" pattern of change in the bonus-to-wage ratio (in particular for the rise, then fall in the ratio shown in the underlying data). The calculations provide a clear answer to the question of the relative responsiveness of wages and bonuses to economic conditions: in every case, the coefficient on the measure of economic conditions is positive and significant, indicating that bonuses are more responsive than wages to economic conditions. Moreover, the coefficient on lagged bonuses is positive and that on lagged wages is negative, of roughly comparable magnitudes, indicating that a "partial adjustment" type of model of the bonusto-wage ratio with persistence of bonuses and wages over time is consistent with the data.
To see whether the results hold up at a more disaggregated level of analysis, we have estimated equations for the ratios of bonuses to wages for two-digit industries over the same time period. The results of this analysis are given in Table II in terms of the number of industries in which bonuses are more (less) responsive to the relevant explanatory variable than are wages, categorized by the size of the t statistic. As can be seen, the analysis supports the finding that bonuses are more responsive than wages to revenues and profits at the two-digit level of aggregation, with the vast majority of industries obtaining positive and often significant (t > 2) impact coefficients. We conclude that although bonuses are not a simple proportion of profits or revenues they depend substantially on those variables, to a much greater extent than wages, and thus vary more with economic conditions than do wages.
How do bonuses and wages, taken as separate variables, respond to economic conditions? Do both wages and bonuses respond positively to conditions with the Table I results due to the greater responsiveness of bonuses, or are bonuses responsive and wages inflexible?
To answer these questions we have estimated the following equations:
log B = A + Au log w (or R) + (I -h)log BeI + CT (la) log W = A' + bh' log 7~ (or R) + (1 -h')log W-I + c'T.
While the results of our analysis, given in Table III , show that bonuses are invariably more responsive than wages to economic conditions, the estimated coefficients tell somewhat different stories for the effect of revenues and the effect of profits on the two measures of pay. While both bonuses and wages are positively related to revenues, only bonuses are significantly affected by profits. Since our measure of profits is an "afterbonus" measure the finding of a positive profit-bonus relation is particularly striking.r4 Finally, note that when the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is interpreted as a partial adjustment parameter, the implied adjustment parameter A is invariably larger in the bonus than in the wage equation, strengthening the conclusion that bonuses are more responsive than wages.
Alternative Spec$cations Thus far, we have estimated models in which bonuses and wages are endogenous variables. Given the timing of negotiations noted in Section I, I4 If there is any resultant error in bonuses, it would induce negative correlation with profits less bonuses. 
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" Equations including P and VA cover 1960-1983. it is also reasonable to examine a model in which wages are exogenous (given, say, by the Shunto Offensive) and bonuses are dependent on wages and economic conditions. If bonuses are simply a markup of wages, as has sometimes been alleged, then the profit or revenue variables would not have a significant effect in this regression. Contrarily, if bonuses were determined solely by "sharing," the wage term would not enter significantly.i5
To examine this possibility we estimate the following equation for all industry and manufacturing: logB=A+Aalogtr(orR)+(l -h)log Be, + AC log W + dT. (2) The results given in lines 1 and 2 and 5 and 6 of Table IV show that while contemporaneous wages are closely related to bonuses, profits or revenues also have highly significant effects, indicating that bonuses depend on both factors. They are neither a pure markup of wages nor a pure markup of profits, although closer to the former than the latter. Finally, in the simple share-economy model workers are presumed to be paid a fixed proportional of profits per worker. To see whether our data are consistent with this view we estimate an equation in which we replace profits and revenues by profits per worker and revenues per worker. We record these results in lines 3 and 4 and 7 and 8 of Table IV . In this calculation we have simply divided fiscal year profits (revenues) by fiscal year employment; we have also experimented with calculations using last period's employment (see Table VI ). As employment is relatively stable and profits are highly variable it does not matter substantially how we model the profit/ employment or revenue/employment variable. As can be seen in Table  IV , the resultant estimates are consistent with our interpretation of bonus determination as paying a share of profits per worker.
Comparing our results to those of other scholars, we are in accord with Weitzman (1986) (who uses somewhat different data) in finding bonuses to depend significantly on profits; in addition, however, we find that bonuses are related to another measure of economic performance, revenues. With respect to the responsiveness of wages to profitability, we cannot find any formal statistical evidence that base wages alone respond to profits, though we do find that wages respond to revenues. Some of the Phillipscurve-like pay-formation regressions in the literature have picked up, we note, a dependence of pay upon profits. I6 But in these exercises the authors typically attempt to explain the formation of total pay-defined as wages plus bonuses-and profits may be primarily affecting the bonus component. On the basis of our findings the entire subject of empirical Phillips curve measurements for Japan is worthy of reexamination, with more careful attention focused on separating base wages from bonuses in the pay-formation process.
Leaving aside the controversial issue of whether or not Japanese base wages themselves are more responsive to economic conditions than base wages in other countries, we conclude that in Japan bonuses respond more than base wages to economic conditions.
III. How Do BONUSES AFFECTEMPLOYMENT?
The finding that bonuses contain at least some "share" component raises the possibility that their impact on employment is different from the impact of wages. In this section we estimate several models of demand-for-labor type designed to examine the possibility. We start with a simple null hypothesis: that bonuses are simply part of normal labor costs comparable to wages, so that the appropriate measure of cost is (W + B), with the division of compensation between wages and bonuses having no effect on outcomes. In particular we estimate two comparable partial adjustment forms of a demand relation between employment (E), bonuses (B), wages (W) ? al., 1983; Koshiro, 1983b;  or the results reported in Hamada and Kurosaia, 1985. In
In Eq. (3a), the hypothesis that bonuses are just part of normal labor cost is tested by the coefficient on In(B): if the form of compensation is irrelevant to employment and the data are determined by demand forces, the coefficient on In(B) will be (approximately) 0 while that on ln(W + B) will be negative. In Eq. (3b), the test of the hypothesis that the composition of compensation is irrelevant to employment is that the coefficient on ln(W + B) be negative and that on In W be zero, Because we include both bonus and wage variables as separate factors in the equation, our model differs from those of other analysts of demand for labor in JapanI
As the reader will note, it is the log form of the demand equations that dictates estimation of the two comparable forms. If we modeled demand as a linear equation, one of the two equations would be redundant.
A significant problem with demand relations of this form relates to the measurement of "level of demand" factors. Some analysts enter output measures or output measures instrumented on other variables to measure the level of demand. Other analysts prefer to exclude such variables due to the production function relation between output and employment. Such exclusions yield reasonable demand relations for some European countries but not for the United States (see Symons and Layard) . To make sure that our results do not depend on how we treat demand-shift variables, we include output measures in some regressions and exclude them from others, with, as will be seen, little effect on our findings.
Another problem with models of this form. relates to specifying the causality as going from wages (bonuses) to employment in an aggregate economy with extremely low unemployment. Most analyses of labor demand, in fact, focus on manufacturing where one can plausibly argue that wages are set economywide, making employment a function of wages at the sector level. A priori, one anticipates that a demand model will fit a single sector better than it will fit an entire, essentially full-employment, labor market.
Table V presents our estimates of the impact of wages, wages plus bonuses, and of bonuses, on employment. Panel A treats the manufacturing industries where our results are particularly striking; Panel B treats the entire economy. The even-numbered equations exclude output; the odd-numbered equations include output as a measure of the level of demand. In addition to the calculations in the table, we experimented with various other demand-shift variables (including profits) and with instrumental variable estimates of demand shifts, instrumenting output on such I7 See the references in footnote 16. factors as exports, money supply, etc. Because inclusion of the output variables has only a modest impact on our estimated bonus and wage coefficients, the way in which we treat demand-shift variables is not a critical issue in the analysis (in contrast to the importance of output terms in U.S. labor demand equations).
The key finding, which runs through all the calculations, is that bonuses and wages have markedly different effects on employment: bonuses obtain positive and wages negative coefficients in the estimates. When our two variables are bonuses and bonuses plus wages, the coefficient on bonuses is significantly positive while the coefficient on wages plus bonuses is significantly negative. When bonuses plus wages are included with wages, the wage term obtains a negative coefficient while the bonus plus wage yields a positive coefficient.
The strength of our finding differs, we note, between highly cyclical manufacturing and the rest of industry. In manufacturing, the two elements of compensation have such different effects that we can fairly readily reject our null hypothesis. In all industry, the weaker estimated negative effect of wages (wages plus bonuses) on employment gives a more equivocal result, although even here it is apparent that bonuses have a positive impact on employment different from the effect of wages.18
What might explain the divergent pattern between all industry and manufacturing? One possibility is that bonuses play one role in a highly cyclical sector and another in the rest of the economy. Another possibility is that the labor supply facing manufacturing is more elastic than is the relatively fixed supply facing the entire economy, permitting bonuses to raise employment more in manufacturing than elsewhere. The first explanation stresses possible differential demand behavior based on cyclical fluctuations while the second stresses differences based on labor supply conditions.
Probing the Results
The finding that bonuses are positively rather than negatively associated with employment (in contrast to wages) is sufficiently striking as to merit additional probing.
Could the result be due to some type of aggregation bias? To see if the result holds up at a more disaggregated level we estimated equations like those in Table V for separate two-digit industries and found results consistent with those in the table. In these calculations bonuses obtain positive coefficients in 6 of 10 manufacturing industries in Eq. (3a) and bonuses plus wages obtain positive coefficients in the same 6 in Eq. I* One interpretation of the "better" results for manufacturing than for all industry is that we are not identifying a demand equation in a full-employment economy.
(3b), with 5 of the positive coefficients having t > 1.r9 In 6 nonmanufacturing industries, by contrast, the results were weaker, which is consistent with the weak economywide results obtained in panel B of the table.20 Our strongest finding is clearly for manufacturing.
Could the result be due to some form of reverse causality or related problem in which bonuses and employment are positively correlated because increases in employment (reflecting good times) cause higher bonuses?
To examine this possibility we have estimated two lagged models which enable us to "test" whether employment determines bonuses or bonuses determine employment by examining the lagged impact of bonuses on employment and of employment on bonuses in the spirit of Sims-Granger causality tests. For simplicity, we report results where all variables are defined on a calendar year basis; the results with bonuses related to fiscal year variables as in our earlier tables give results comparable to those in the table. The results, given in Table VI, suggest that the causal link is from bonuses to employment rather than from employment to bonuses. In manufacturing, lagged bonuses have a positive effect on employment (in contrast to the negative effect of lagged wages on employment), while lagged employment has a negative effect on bonuses. In all industry, bonuses have an insignificant positive impact on employment (contrasted to a negative effect for wages) whereas employment negatively affects bonuses. These results are inconsistent with an employment-causes-bonuses model but are, we note, consistent with a share-model interpretation of the data, as increases in employment reduce workers' earnings from profit sharing in the share model. Taking our finding of a positive bonus-employment relation at face value, how might we go about interpreting it?
There seem to be two basic modes of interpretation: one in which bonuses are viewed as operating along theoretic share-economy lines; and one in which bonuses are taken as an indicator of the level of demand in a given period.
First, from a share-economy perspective, one may want to read the result as indicating that bonuses, while part of the attractiveness of jobs to workers, are not fully part of the marginal cost of employment to firms. From this perspective the data suggest that we are estimating a mixed supply-anddemand reduced-form equation, with W + B primarily reflecting supply influences on employment and W primarily reflecting demand 1959-1982. influences, with the gap between them indicating the "excess demand" for labor in a share system.21 What might one do to test such an interpretation? One approach would be to develop a detailed econometric model of supply-and-demand disequilibrium to estimate the "structural equations" and to evaluate the predicted excess demand for labor. To implement such a program in practice would require more data on the Japanese labor market than the wage, employment, and bonus series that we have analyzed here. For example, one would want some direct measure of the share parameter that in principle determines the contract, rather than measures of bonuses. (Bonuses differ significantly from share parameters in that they change for two reasons: changes in labor's share of profits (revenues) or changes in the level of profits (revenues).) One would also want direct measures of vacancies by sector and over time to indicate potential changes and differences in "excess demand for labor" as bonuses vary. It would also be useful to have evidence on patterns of recruitment of new workers. In the absence of such data, and the need to make specific and somewhat arbitrary assumptions about disequilibrium forms, we are loathe to pursue this line with our data. Virtually any reasonable disequilibrium formulation will end up with reduced-form mixed supply-anddemand equations like those we have estimated, with predicted coefficients having signs like those we have found.
A second possible interpretation of our finding is that bonuses are a "proxy" for shifts in labor demand. We do not think that this offers as good an interpretation of the data. First, we have attempted to control for such demand shifts by the explicit inclusion of output terms; yet the signs on bonuses and wages were unchanged. Additionally, the causal lag relation between employment and bonuses we have found is inconsistent with this view. Furthermore, it is not enough for a particular firm or sector to "demand" more labor in a full-employment economy; a plausible story must be told about how the labor is obtained-e.g., through increased pay ( W + B) on the supply side. Of course it is still logically possible to argue that bonuses are a superior measure of the level of the labor-demand schedule. (After all, we did find them to vary substantially with the cycle.) Even this interpretation, however, clearly supports the notion that bonuses are not part of normal labor cost.
In any case, whatever the ultimate explanation, bonuses are different from wages in Japan, in their effects on employment as well as in their sensitivity to economic conditions. Without pushing the "share economy" interpretation of the data too far, our results do seem to have the "flavor" of such a system.
IV. MACROECONOMICIMPLICATIONS OFTHEBONUS SYSTEM
We come now to the difficult question of whether the Japanese bonus system influences macroeconomic performance, and more particularly, whether it helps account for the low unemployment rates found in Japan FREEMAN AND WEITZMAN over the last quarter century. ** Other things being equal, it stands to reason that the existence of a bonus component of pay with a more automatic procyclical link than base wages should help an economy to maintain a higher level of employment than would be maintained if wages alone were paid. But how important a factor, quantitatively, is this likely to be in the Japanese case? Given the current state of macroeconomics, with widely divergent schools of thought, it is not clear how to pose the appropriate hypothesis formally so that the existing data might, at least in principle, allow us to extricate an answer that is reasonably controversyfree. Rather than trying to confront the issue head on with a formal model, we limit ourselves here to some rough calculations designed to give likely orders of magnitudes of effects. The bonus itself is about one-fourth of an average worker's total pay. By running regressions in logarithms we have estimated the elasticity of aggregate bonus response to changed aggregate profits at about 0.09 (see line 3, Table III ). Converting this parameter to a linear equivalent, we obtain the same elasticity of 0.09 if 9% of the bonus payment is strictly proportional to profits, while the other 91% is like a fixed constant, The following crude imputation can then be made. About 2.25% (9% x 25%) of a Japanese worker's total pay can be treated as genuine profit-sharing income, compared with the other 97.75%, which for economic purposes is better described as being like an imputed base wage.
A rough check on this calculation is possible using our equations linking bonuses to revenues. The elasticity of aggregate bonus payments with respect to aggregate value added, or revenue, was estimated to be about 0.44 (see line 1, Table III ). Converting to an equivalent-elasticity linear revenue-sharing formula makes 44% of the bonus payment strictly proportional to revenues, while the other 56% is like a fixed constant. If aggregate imputed base wages are roughly three-fourths of aggregate revenues, that leaves one-fourth for gross profits. By this calculation, 11% (4 x 44%) of the bonus payment is strictly proportional to profits, while the rest is like a fixed constant. Following this line of reasoning, about 2.75% 22 It should be noted that Japan's number one status in having the lowest unemployment rate among major industrialized economies did not emerge until the 1970s. In the 196Os, some other countries like Germany had equally good employment records. There has been some discussion in the literature about the extent to which Japanese statistics may underestimate the unemployment rate by international standards. Taira (1983) and a few others have tried to argue this case. But it is not very convincing (see, e.g., Sorrentino, 1984; Hamada and Kurosaka, 1985) . The basic point is that when reasonable adjustment measures are applied uniformly to all countries in an attempt to make international standards more uniform, then all countries' unemployment rates increase slightly, but without much altering their relative standing. Japan's unemployment record remains outstanding even after readjustment.
(11% x 25%) of a typical Japanese worker's total pay can be treated as genuinely proportional to profits, while the remainder is like an imputed base wage.
Splitting the difference between the high (2.75%) and low (2.25%) calculations, we can make the following very rough statement: in any year about 97.5% of an average Japanese worker's total pay is like a fixed imputed base wage, while 2.5% automatically responds directly to profits. If pay contracts are annually renegotiated, the marginal cost to the employer of hiring an extra unit of labor in any given year is just the (imputed) base wage, as opposed to total pay. If the relevant contract adjustment period is more than a year, due to pay parameter stickiness, the profit-sharing component grows in importance relative to the base wage component because of the distributed-lag difference equation. In that case the effect of profit sharing is somewhat more pronounced. Taking the 2.5% as a conservative measure of the pure-profit-sharing part of pay, the relevant theory predicts that the Japanese economy should behave like an otherwise absolutely identical (but hypothetical) wage economy whose wages are 2.5% lower than actual Japanese pay (base wages plus bonus) but whose maintained levels of aggregate demand (autonomous spending, the money supply, and world demand for Japanese exports) are the same.23 In other words, if someone who thought that Japan was a wage economy and has just now been informed that it is in fact (partially) a revenue-or profit-sharing economy wants to know what difference that makes, the answer is: the same difference as ifmoney wages were perpetually 2.5% lower than what they appeared to be.
While the exact ramifications of a 2.5% wage cut depend on the macromodel in which it is embedded, our reaction is neither to dismiss this effect as negligible nor to argue that it is likely to represent an overwhelming factor in the economy. At one extreme, assume a model in which a 2.5% reduction in wages reduces prices by 2.5%. Supposing, further, that this is equivalent to a 2.5% expansion in output, then employment will increase 2.5% (given constant returns to scale). At another extreme, assume that a 2.5% reduction in wages does not affect prices at all (they are set on world markets) so that the reduction in wages raises employment along a fixed demand curve. If the elasticity of demand is taken conservatively to be about one-half, we would have 1.25% higher employment, giving us a range of employment effects from 1.25 to 2.5%.
Such counterfactual exercises should be understood in proper perspective. First, the calculations are extremely crude. Second, they are based on a particular interpretation of a particular theory. Third, the "thought experiment" is necessarily artificial. (If there were lower bonuses but higher base wages, it could be argued, wages might become more flexible, timing in the economy might be altered, or fiscal or monetary policy might be changed, perhaps thereby neutralizing some of the effects calculated here.) Limitations notwithstanding, we think the exercise is useful for gaining some rough insight into the likely size of what might be called the ' 'pure bonus effect. " We interpret the orders of magnitude involved as suggesting that the Japanese bonus system may have exerted a nonnegligible macroeconomic influence by helping automatically to boost employment without inflationary pressure. But the significance of an "as if" 2.5% money wage cut is not nearly so great as to account for the entire unemployment story, nor to eliminate demand-caused output fluctuations,24 nor to do away with the need for discretionary policy to maintain full employment, especially in the face of severe economic shocks.
That the bonus system alone cannot possibly be explaining the entire macroeconomic adjustment story is made abundantly clear by the extreme example of Japan's response to the energy crisis. After the first oil shock, in 1974, consumer prices increased by about 25% and wholesale prices by over 30%; output in manufacturing and mining fell by 10%. At first the unions had no better premonition than other groups that a permanent terms-of-trade deterioration was under way, and they were concerned to recoup lost purchasing power as well as to obtain their customary pay increase. In the spring offensive of that year, base wages jumped by 33% while strike days lost were 2.7 per 10,000, a rate double that in previous years and above the rate in the United States in many years. An observer looking simply at these figures would have predicted that the Japanese economy would have been more likely to have gone into a major stagflation decline than the U.S. or European economies. But such was not the case. At this point, when the mechanics of a potentially vicious wage-price spiral started to become evident, the Japanese consensus took over. Government officials, labor experts, businessmen, and labor union leaders began preaching wage and price restraint. The 1975 shunto 24 Depending on how output is detrended from its high growth rates, Japanese output stability might be judged outstanding or mediocre. Actually, Japan has the steadiest growth rate among all OECD countries over the past quarter century if it is measured by relative deviations from a standardized mean. In terms of absolute deviations from a nonstandardized mean, Japanese growth shows much more cyclical variability. Note that, with a sprinkling of temporary price stickiness, the relevant model of a profit-sharing economy would predict relatively full employment but some building up of inventories, make-work, or labor hoarding during slack periods. Thus, the large Okun coefficient for Japan (see Hamada and Kurosaka, 1984) is not in itself a theoretical contradiction with share-economy-like interpretations. saw base wages increase by only 13%, and they have been held to the single-digit range since then; the consumer price index rate of increase fell to 10.4%, and while output in manufacturing and mining declined by 4.4% in 1975 it rose by 10.8% in 1976. Strike days lost fell sharply to 0.9 per 10,000 in 1976 and to virtually zero in succeeding years.2s
Because base wages constitute three-fourths of Japanese pay, and only a part of bonuses is responsive to profits (revenue), the deceleration of wage increases was quantitatively more important than the adjustment of bonuses in stabilizing employment. However much the Japanese bonus system may be helping as an automatic employment stabilizer (months-ofbonus pay declined sharply after 1974 while the ratio of bonuses to wages fell from a peak value of 0.35 in 1974 to 0.29 in 1983, according to the figures in Appendixes A and B), in stepping back from high inflation in the mid-1970s Japan relied to a greater extent upon flexible wage setting than upon flexible bonuses, as it had to, given the share of wages in total compensation and the magnitude of the macroeconomic shock.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined a relatively unique aspect of the Japanese labor market-payment of bonuses which constitute a quarter of workers' pay. Our analysis has rejected the notion that bonuses are just another form of wage payment on two grounds: (1) Bonuses behave differently than wages over the cycle, responding to profits and responding more to revenues than do wages; and (2) bonuses affect employment differently than wages, having a positive rather than a negative link to employment. While bonuses are not set by pure share-economy principles, they are sufficiently responsive to profits or revenues and affect employment in ways that have the flavor of a share economy. Our estimate is that they contribute somewhat to the success of the Japanese economy by automatically helping to stabilize unemployment at relatively low levels. The importance of reductions in the rate of change of base wages during the first oil crisis, however, makes it clear that, as presently constituted, the bonus system in Japan is by no means the main factor behind Japanese ability to weather severe shocks of that kind better than most other developed countries. This example highlights our basic conclusion. The bonus system helps Japan to maintain relatively tight labor markets, but so too do other, probably complementary aspects of the Japanese system beyond the focus of this study. The ratio B/C is used as an estimate of the ratio of regular workers in firms with 5 or more regular workers to regular workers in firms with 30 or more (the actual ratio was unavailable except for 1960). A comparison of the two ratios for 1960 by industry was favorable, indicating that the estimate is a fairly good one. The end-ofyear data for 1958-1963 was scaled to a first-of-year basis based on the 1963/1964 comparison. The first-of-year series was then shifted to a calendar year average. These data were used on a fiscal year basis in Tables I through  IV and on a calendar year basis in Tables V and VI 
